LF Economics. Australia: A Haven for White-Collar. Criminality and Control Fraud. Parliament of Australia. Senate Standing Committees on Economics. Request PDF | Economics For a Higher Education | The author addresses what mainstream economics, from academics and from students citing Keen () and. Debunking Economics - Revised and Expanded Edition - Steve Keen BT4G (torenntinoana.site) is not a tracker and doesn't store any content and only collects torrent. FRED ALAN WOLF LEGENDADO TORRENT You browse Installation Guide it was this software for a a headless machine with. Applicable to parameter selects. I ve this, please port is well as Zebedee documentation.
Kotz considers several possible directions of economic restructuring, concluding that significant economic change is likely in the years ahead. Get A Copy. Hardcover , pages. Published February 9th by Harvard University Press. More Details Other Editions 2. All Editions. Friend Reviews. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. Lists with This Book.
Community Reviews. Showing Average rating 4. Rating details. Sort order. Dec 16, Lauren Koleda rated it it was amazing. In my experience it's rare to find a book written by an economist that you can read cover to cover, rather than just skim through. I honestly didn't think one existed. It may be because of the subject material covered is particularly interesting to me, but every word in this book was interesting and easily digestible.
I'll be recommending it to friends and classmates for sure. Jul 03, Mike rated it really liked it. Not a bad read. A little dense and helps to have a little background in economics. It does not, in my opinion, add much more insight to the mountain of books published on the modern American economy and financialization of society.
Less of a narrative and more of an academic presentation. Jan 03, glyndiana rated it it was amazing. It hurts pretty bad when it falls on you. Mar 26, Paul Womack rated it really liked it. A well organized and succinct treatment of capitalism over the last years, but with a focus on the emergence of neoliberalism and its emphasis on markets and profits, and the systemic decisions made to enhance the development of speculative and risky practices leading to the crisis of I found it helpful, but wish the footnotes had been more thorough.
The bibliography contains suggested additional readings. I appreciated his suggestions for a way forward but am not persuaded socialism w A well organized and succinct treatment of capitalism over the last years, but with a focus on the emergence of neoliberalism and its emphasis on markets and profits, and the systemic decisions made to enhance the development of speculative and risky practices leading to the crisis of I appreciated his suggestions for a way forward but am not persuaded socialism will be that way.
I read this book while the Republicans debated their American Health Care Act and gave me insights into why it was a bad idea and deserved its fate. The British Academy's answer grudgingly confessed to the combined sins of smug rhetoric and linear extrapolation. Together, these sins fed into the self-congratulatory conviction that a paradigm shift had occurred, enabling the world of finance to create unlimited, benign, riskless debt.
The first sin, which took the form of a mathematized rhetoric, lulled authorities and academics into a false belief that financial innovation had engineered risk out of the system; that the new instruments allowed a new form of debt with the properties of quicksilver.
Once loans were originated, they were then sliced up into tiny pieces, blended together in packages that contained different degrees of risk, and sold all over the globe. By thus spreading financial risk, so the rhetoric went, no single agent faced any significant danger that they would be hurt if some debtors went bust. It was a New Age faith in the financial sector's powers to create 'riskless risk', which culminated in the belief that the planet could now sustain debts and bets made on the back of these debts that were many multiples of actual, global income.
Vulgar empiricism shored up such mystical beliefs: back in , when the so-called 'new economy' collapsed, destroying much of the paper wealth made from the dotcom bubble and the Enron-like scams, the system held together. The new economy bubble was, in fact, worse than the sub-prime mortgage equivalent that burst six years later.
And yet the ill effects were contained efficiently by the authorities even though employment did not recover until — According to the British Academy's explanation which, it must be said, is widely shared , the Crash of happened because by then — and unbeknownst to the armies of hyper-smart men and women whose job was to have known better — the risks that had been assumed to be riskless had become anything but.
Banks like the Royal Bank of Scotland, which employed 4, 'risk managers', ended up consumed by a black hole of 'risk gone sour'. The world, in this reading, paid the price for believing its own rhetoric and for assuming that the future would be no different from the very recent past. Thinking that it had successfully diffused risk, our financialized world created so much that it was consumed by it.
Markets determine the price of lemons. And they do so with minimal institutional input, since buyers know a good lemon when they are sold one. The same cannot be said of bonds or, even worse, of synthetic financial instruments. Buyers cannot taste the 'produce', squeeze it to test for ripeness, or smell its aroma. They rely on external, institutional information and on well-defined rules that are designed and policed by dispassionate, incorruptible authorities.
This was the role, supposedly, of the credit rating agencies and of the state's regulatory bodies. Undoubtedly, both types of institution were found not just wanting but culpable. When, for instance, a collateralized debt obligation CDO — a paper asset combining a multitude of slices of many different types of debt — carried a triple-A rating and offered a return 1 per cent above that of US Treasury Bills, the significance was twofold: the buyer could feel confident that the purchase was not a dud and, if the buyer was a bank, it could treat that piece of paper as indistinguishable from and not an iota riskier than the real money with which it had been bought.
This pretence helped banks to attain breathtaking profits for two reasons. This meant that they could use with impunity their own clients' deposits to buy the triple-A rated CDOs without compromising their ability to make new loans to other clients and other banks. So long as they could charge higher interest rates than they paid, buying triple-A rated CDOs enhanced the banks' profitability without limiting their loan-making capacity.
The CDOs were, in effect, instruments for bending the very rules designed to save the banking system from itself. The crucial detail here is that the loans secured from the central bank by pawning the triple-A rated CDO bore the pitiful interest rates charged by the central bank.
Then, when the CDO matured, at an interest rate of 1 per cent above what the central bank was charging, the banks kept the difference. The combination of these two factors meant that the issuers of CDOs had good cause:. Alas, this was an open invitation to print one's own money! The incentives were incendiary: the more the financial institutions borrowed in order to buy the triple-A rated CDOs, the more money they made.
The dream of an ATM in one's living room had come true, at least for the private financial institutions and the people running them. With these facts before us, it is not hard to come to the conclusion that the Crash of was the inevitable result of granting to poachers the role of gamekeeper.
Their power was blatant and their image as the postmodern wizards conjuring up new wealth and new paradigms was unchallenged. The bankers paid the credit rating agencies to extend triple-A status to the CDOs that they issued; the regulating authorities including the central bank accepted these ratings as kosher; and the up-and-coming young men and women who had secured a badly paid job with one of the regulating authorities soon began to plan a career move to Lehman Brothers or Moody's.
Overseeing all of them was a host of treasury secretaries and finance ministers who had either already served for years at Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, etc. In an environment that reverberated with the popping of champagne corks and the revving of gleaming Porsches and Ferraris; in a landscape where torrents of bank bonuses flooded into already wealthy areas further boosting the real estate boom and creating new bubbles from Long Island and London's East End to the suburbs of Sydney and the high-rise blocks of Shanghai ; in that ecology of seemingly self-propagating paper wealth, it would take a heroic — a reckless — disposition to sound the alarm bells, to ask the awkward questions, to cast doubt on the pretence that triple-A rated CDOs carried zero risk.
Even if some incurably romantic regulator, trader or senior banker were to raise the alarm, she would be well and truly trumped, ending up a tragic, crushed figure in history's gutter. The Brothers Grimm had a story involving a magic pot that embodied industrialization's early dreams — of automated cornucopias fulfilling all our desires, unstoppably.
It was also a bleak and cautionary tale that demonstrated how those industrial dreams might turn into a nightmare. For, towards the end of the story, the wondrous pot runs amok and ends up flooding the village with porridge. Technology turned nasty, in much the same way as Mary Shelley's ingenious Dr Frankenstein had his own creation turn viciously against him.
In similar fashion, the virtual automated telling machines ATMs conjured up by Wall Street, the credit rating agencies and the regulators who connived with them flooded the financial system with a modern-day porridge, which ended up choking the whole planet. And when, in autumn of , the ATMs stopped working, a world addicted to synthesized porridge juddered to a grinding halt.
Humans are greedy creatures who only feign civility. Given the slightest chance, they will steal, plunder and bully. This dim view of our human lot leaves no room even for a modicum of hope that intelligent bullies will consent to rules banning bullying. For even if they do, who will enforce them?
To keep the bullies in awe, some Leviathan with extraordinary power will be necessary. But then again, who will keep tabs on the Leviathan? Such are the workings of the neoliberal mind, yielding the conclusion that crises may be necessary evils; that no human design can avert economic meltdowns. For a few decades, beginning with President Roosevelt's post attempts to regulate the banks, the Leviathan solution became widely accepted: the state could and should play its Hobbesian role in regulating greed and bringing it into some balance with propriety.
The Glass—Steagall Act of is possibly the most often quoted example of that regulatory effort. However, the s saw a steady retreat away from this regulatory framework and toward the re-establishment of the fatalistic view that human nature will always find ways of defeating its own best intentions. This 'retreat to fatalism' coincided with the period when neoliberalism and financialization were rearing their unsightly heads.
This meant a new take on the old fatalism: the Leviathan's overwhelming power, while necessary to keep the bullies in their place, was choking growth, constraining innovation, putting the brakes on imaginative finance, and thus keeping the world stuck in a low gear just when technological innovations offered the potential to whisk us onto higher planes of development and prosperity.
Rather, they are symptoms of a much deeper malaise which can be traced all the way back to the Great Crash of , then on through to the s: the time when a Global Minotaur was born. Going beyond this, Varoufakis reveals how we might reintroduce a modicum of reason into what has become a perniciously irrational economic order.
Previous page. Next page. Yanis Varoufakis. Regulatory capture Markets determine the price of lemons. The combination of these two factors meant that the issuers of CDOs had good cause: a to issue as many of them as they physically could; b to borrow as much money as possible to buy other issuers' CDOs; and c to keep vast quantities of such paper assets on their books.
Irrepressible greed 'It's the nature of the beast', goes the third explanation. Excerpted by permission of Zed Books Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher. Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc.
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Peter McCormack : Maybe you can facilitate that one to happen then, because-. Peter McCormack : You did predict the crisis of , but at what point did you realize there was a problem? How far back did this go?
I successfully did that sometime in I wrote my first paper about it in August of , and I submitted that to a journal. For various reasons, it took three years to appear. It being the financial crisis of the Great Depression. Why had one not occurred by ? Now that rules out, completely rules out conventional economics, Neo-Classical theory. They just completely leave out the financial sector.
They assume a stability of the economy. We can gather some interesting analogies there. The most remarkable feature about it was that it did generate the possibility for a great depression, but the most remarkable thing about it was that before the Great Depression occurred, it generated what was later called the Great Moderation.
In other words, if you looked at the cycles in employment and a proxy for inflation, which I had in that model, they diminished before the crisis hit. Steve Keen : I was aware that a period of apparent moderation was actually a bad sign, not a good one. That was the background.
Then for various reasons, I wrote a book called, I wrote Debunking Economics in and Became consumed with fighting the Neo-Classicals over some of my critiques of Neo-Classical theory for the next four years. When I was about to get down and write sort of my magnum opus in economics at the time, if you like, by sheer chance I got asked to do an expert witness on predatory lending in Australia. In writing my expert witness case, I only had nine days to get it done, my mistake, I thought I had two weeks, I had nine days.
In writing it, I wrote this throwaway line about how the private debt to GDP ratio had been rising exponentially. That gave me a correlation coefficient from to , of I think about 0. Somebody has to warn about it. Peter McCormack : Is it all forms of private debt, or was the main catalyst mortgage debt? You can get a financial crisis just out of corporate debt, and we had that back in , when you look at the fluctuations in Australian corporate debt, and American for that matter, of course.
Steve Keen : What happened after was, pretty much globally, but certainly American, Australia, it just sort of sticks out like a sore thumb. The banking sector had pushed as much debt as they could manage onto the corporate sector. Even though the corporate sector gets caught up in euphoric expectations, with lunatics like Alan Bond being a classic instance of that.
Peter McCormack : Wow, okay. Where are the flaws in the current economic models? How is this allowed to happen? Who benefits from it? Nobody benefited from the model of Ptolemaic astronomy. There was an entire intellectual priesthood dedicated to building extremely complicated models of the universe, assuming the Earth was almost the centre of the universe, and that all the planets and stars, and the sun and moon, orbited the Earth on perfect circles, which occasionally were perfect circles on perfect circles, etc.
Steve Keen : Now, the same thing applies in economic theory. They began in the s, mainstream economics began effectively as a counter-movement to Karl Marx, because Marx had turned the previous classical school of economics into a critique of it, rather than a defence of capitalism against feudalism, which is the way it was used by Smith and Ricardo.
They developed mathematical models of the economy reaching equilibrium back then. That became the mental structure for mainstream economics ever since. Steve Keen : As part of that, to make it easy, so they thought, to work out how equilibrium might be achieved in a whole range of markets at once, they decided to leave out the complication of the monetary sector. Now, in fact, it turned out to be impossible to prove what they wanted to prove, that these markets would actually reach equilibrium through a tatonnement process, but they stuck with the abstraction, so called, of leaving out the banking sector.
Steve Keen : It started coming back through sheer realism in the s and s. A range of orthodox economists, including for example, Pigou, who was actually the guy that Keynes critiqued in the general theory, he understood that banks created money. Irving Fisher learned that the hard way. They built models where banks are effectively what they call intermediaries, not actually originators of loans and money, but intermediaries between borrowers and savers.
Their models, including the ones which the absolute halcyon, we finally got the model of the capitalist economy, they completely left out money, banks, debt, and non-equilibrium processes. In terms of what they benefited from, they dominated the profession. They still do. Their benefit was that they were the economic, the recognised process of economics. They also benefited from all the deregulation proposals that the financial sector put forward.
Economists were completely in favour of that, because of course, getting rid of regulation makes systems work better. The benefit was indirect, rather than direct. I was stunned when I first saw the data for the UK house private debt levels. Peter McCormack : Can you explain what deregulation of the mortgage market meant for the economy, and therefore what the impact was?
Building societies actually are intermediaries. Steve Keen : The building society then lends out again to people in the local area to build a property. You get a check drawn on the bank, the building society banks, rather than cash from the building society itself, or a deposit transfer from the building society. No money is created. Steve Keen : Then when Maggie deregulated the mortgage market in , that let the banks into it.
Simultaneously we record an asset for ourselves. You owe us 50, pounds. What you get is a positive feedback between the level of mortgage debt and the level of house prices. Steve Keen : America had these ups and downs all the way through its history, going back to as far as I can take it back, which is It was gob smacking. You also said that little has changed since the crisis of The US is potentially heading for a new financial crisis in One of my previous guests talked about a potential bond crisis.
Are you seeing a similar potential threat? My characterisation of what happens after a financial crisis depends on what happens to the level of private debt. The new money causes new demand as well. You get an economy dependent upon a high level of credit based demand. You imagine that much of a boost to a demand above and beyond the turnover of existing money.
Now what that gives you, an enormous swollen aggregate demand, which starts off in asset markets normally, cascades through the whole economy, causes a total slump. In the aftermath, people are trying to pay their debt down. That is that as you pay the debt down, as much as creating new debt creates additional demand, along with additional money, paying existing debt down destroys demand and destroys money. Peter McCormack : Right. That means that just relying upon bankruptcy processes or debt repayment processes can actually make a debt deflation worse.
What you have is in the aftermath, the debt stopped falling, people are borrowing money once more in America. Peter McCormack : Right, okay. Too much private debt is a problem also because it creates inequality? I added into it effectively bankers, by having debt, which capitalists would borrow, borrow money to finance building factories. It was all productive investment. The third social class, and the third social class makes its money by charging interest on the level of debt.
Even though the capitalists were doing the borrowing of the money, it was workers who paid for it, in terms of a lower income share. Steve Keen : That is you have a system which is driven by the rate of profit. The rate of profit determines the level of investment. Below it, they invest less than they earn, so they can pay some of their debt off. Ultimately, the boom hits. You have, in my model, you just have increasing wage costs.
In the real world, you have increasing raw materials cost as well. They stop investing. The economy slows down. Workers start to get higher unemployment and lower wage change coming out of that. Steve Keen : Now you repeat that process by several booms and slumps, and you finally get to the point where you have a crisis like we had in Capitalists getting much the same level, until the crunch hits.
Steve Keen : Rising inequality was actually an essential part of the model, in terms of how I built the model. Steve Keen : Totally. They had no damn idea the crisis was coming. They were completely surprised by it. They thought they understood the economy and they thought it was looking fantastic for They have no idea of what to do. Steve Keen : They did the one thing they knew how to do, which was throw money at the financial sector.
In the American economy, American legal system actually prevent the Federal Reserve having any accounting relations with the non-financial sector. There was a loophole, and that was actually eliminated by Glass-Steagall. The people that they have bank accounts for are financial institutions.
The one place they can pump money quickly is into the financial institutions. That will cause what they call a wealth effect, and the wealth effect would then mean the economy boom. The rising asset markets will counteract the decline in the economy. The ownership of shares is massively concentrated.
It added to the inequality that was already caused by the boom that led to the crisis in the first place. Peter McCormack : Therefore this inequality is probably leading to societal problems. Actually, do you think the Brexit vote and the election of Trump is a reflection on this social inequality? Steve Keen : Totally, totally. Again, I make a lot of these cases in my Debunking Economics as well.
What you have is a system which … The model that the Neo-Classical economists built completely leaves power out of the process. Perfect competition has no power. A worker is just as strong as an employer in the bargaining process to determine a wage. In fact, in the real world what it means is workers get screwed, manufacturing moves offshore, countries like the UK, which fall for this stuff, get completely de-industrialised.
Third World countries do pretty nicely out of it sometimes. What you get out of that is a resentment of the ex-working class and the ex-middle class, who are being shafted by the system. Yeah, that looks like a good idea to me.
Peter McCormack : Yes, and I will share that out in the show notes. It has to have flaws to function as a capitalist system. I think one of the great weaknesses of the human species is we have this belief of a perfect world, and you find it in every … Every culture has its Valhalla. Every society has this ideal world where everything happens perfectly, a bit Garden of Eden, etc. What economic theory, Neo-Classical theory promised was a perfect world on this planet. You get sucked into this belief in perfection.
Steve Keen : What Minsky is saying is get used to it. The real world is not a porcelain doll. These flaws are due to characteristics a sophisticated capitalistic economy must have. Such a system will be capable of generating signals that induce an increased desire to invest and of financing that investment. Steve Keen : You want capitalists.
The good thing about the capitalist system is innovation and change. You want them to want to be investing. When they do it, the income distribution signal will change to make it worth their while, or looking like worthwhile to invest. Peter McCormack : Has globalisation made this more of a complex problem to solve? It almost feels like any large Western government headed into a financial crisis means all large Western governments likely will. That means that the contagion of the American bubble, the subprime bubble, spread through the entire planet because people were buying CDOs and CDSs and everything else globally.
That contagion can cause a collapse. The first company to go under was British, was the AIG. They had bought so many of the CDOs, had them on their books, they were the suckers of the Big Short. You get a total mess. As a result, when the Federal Reserve did its rescues of the American financial system, it also rescued large segments of the UK system and the Australian system. Steve Keen : It makes it even worse when you allow these internationalised, deregulated finance.
Prevent finance from becoming anything other than a national endeavour. Peter McCormack : Okay. Peter McCormack : It came out the 31st of October, , my 30th birthday. Steve Keen : Happy birthday. Steve Keen : Maybe not happy birthday. It was seen as a response to the financial crisis. Peter McCormack : My first question is what is Bitcoin to you?
Steve Keen : I know that the header in the first Bitcoin is about the English Chancellor announcing the second rescue of the banks sometime in Steve Keen : Exactly, exactly. The best expression of this ever written was by a wonderful Italian economist called Augusto Graziani, and Augusto stood all of about five foot nothing. You never saw a man stand taller when he gave a speech.
That effectively gives me the right of seigniorage. The only way you can make sense of all this is that money is a promise to pay a third party, which both the parties of a transaction accept. Money, in that sense, is a non-commodity. Bitcoin was never built with that understanding. Before we get into my questions on Bitcoin, because I find your perspectives on it very interesting, and actually one of the things that I can easily do with a podcast like this is just have lots of pro-Bitcoin economists or pro-Bitcoin technologists on.
Full content visible, double tap to read brief content. See more on the author's page. Customer reviews. How customer reviews and ratings work Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon. Top reviews Most recent Top reviews. Top reviews from the United States. There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later. Verified Purchase. When a bank wins a foreclosure case, they get a free house. The monetary policy in the USA is outrageous because the bank never offered any consideration when they issued a loan.
There was no fractional reserve lending nor was the bank acting as an intermediary. The bank never offered their own wealth. No money was taken from any so-called deposits, the entire loan was a fiction based on the signing and tendering of a newly created promissory note. Yet when you read Austrian economics you are not told the empirical truth that the bank singly endogenously created the money they loaned. This is just a very small part of what I learned from reading Steve Keen.
There are three money aggregate measurements that are important to this comment: base and the M2. Then there is the amount of credit issue. How does it jump from1. Most economic educators would attribute the money expansion to fractional reserve lending, but this was debunked decades ago when the credit was shown to grow too rapidly. The answer to this money expansion is endogenous money. If you listen to the Fed chairman, the sage government and bank economists and the talking heads on CNN, you will never understand how the economy really works.
Steve Keen systematically demolishes the underpinnings of neo-classical economic thought and shows them to be fallacious myths. The economy is dynamic system and rarely in equilibrium. Neo-classical theory is based on the economy being in equilibrium. It is no wonder then that economic bubbles and depressions come as a surprise to economists because they cannot happen according to their theories.
That is why they call them "exogenous" shocks. If other sciences like physics, chemistry and even biology based their theories similarly, we would still be living in the stone age. The wonder to me is that, even with the incompetent interference of the central banks and governments, the economy functions as well as has. Keen does a great job of systematically debunking most cherished beliefs of neoclassical economics.
The bankruptcy of the conventional theory is brought out with adequate rigour and detail. The book does have an antagonistic tone throughout but that is only to be expected. Some more details on alternative approaches would have been better. Maybe in a sequel! Steve makes a quick walk through the Steve makes a quick walk through the history and development of economics, outlining in a sharp and clear way for the non-economist reader all of the different thoughts and assumptions that where made from leading economists to develop the theory of economics.
He then addresses the problems with these way of thinking on the economy and describes alternative ways of thinking, so as to come up with a more realistic and accurate model of how the economy works. Keen's Master-idea is that the money and debt are not created the way it is described in the textbooks. In classical "textbook" view, the banks receive deposits and create reserves first, and make loans later.
In real world Keen argues, the banking sector creates loans and goes looking for the reserves later. His other important idea is that the main factor that causes economic contraction or expansion, and also has caused the brief recovery--and will also cause the dreaded "double dip" recession in the U. The Credit Impulse a. Keen discovers a paradox - because aggregate demand is the sum of GDP plus the change of debt, the rate of change of aggregate demand can be BOOSTED by a slowdown in the rate at which debt is falling.
The U. FED had stumbled on it by chance - the slight recovery of the U. The factor that makes the recent recovery of the U. Keen states that contrary to the neoclassical model of equilibrium, a capitalist economy is characterized by excess supply in all times, even during booms.
According to Keen, the main constraint facing capitalist economies is not supply, but demand. The end game here, the way out of the debt, will be many years in the future, if ever. The book contains many things: among them a scathing critic of neo-classical economic theories, but also, interestingly, of Marx. I highly recommend it.
See all reviews. Top reviews from other countries. A revelation. Having read Steve Keen's book, I know describe myself as a "recovering economist. Max Planck once said "Physics advances one funeral at a a time. Because the neoclassical economists knew what result they wanted free markets are best, mmmkay? Piece by piece Keen blows the whole edifice apart. The arguments he presents are convincing, revelationary, revolutionary, even.
And yet they're not new by any stretch, they've just been brushed under the carpet by a dishonest, delusional profession for the last years. You'll want to buy the supplement that goes with this book, the material will be heavy going without the graphs, which make it much easier to understand. Can't recommend highly enough. My favourite book on the wonderful subject of economics. One person found this helpful. His YTs are better. This is a book of comparative economics covering the pros and cons as is typical of the teaching methodology in the social sciences.
It is mainly neo-classical economics he wishes to debunk as a cargo cult which is the dominant methodology taught in schools and universities to the exclusion of reality. After reading several economic books this is the one where I really understood about the economics' landscape and the many choices of methodology which should be in the curriculum in education. Edward Griffin in nhis book The Creature from Jekyll Island states that economics in universities was promoted by the banks in the earlt 20th centuary to imoose a deception on the public absolutly contrary to what the banks wanted the public to discover that banks don't act as intermediaries but are the engines of credit and inflation creation and interest collection on what cost them nothing to lend.
The ideology of neo-classical economics from the s was to suppress the working class organisation of socialism and trade unions. Economics should be taught as an objective theory. The 3rd edition is due to be rewritten from according to author on YT. His published academic papers are in a book form Developing an Economics for the Post-Crisis World ; but the best of his work is on many YT videos which advertises his free economic software modelling tool QED now called Minsky.
His web sites have changed. A recent book is Can we avoid another financial crisis? As the figures are not contained in this edition of the reviewed book they can be down loaded from publisher Zed books for free or bought Debunking Economics Supplement to the Revised and Expanded Edition or here due to an Amazon screw up but that is Out-of-Stock as well.
I'm always intrigued when top researchers dispute conventional facts. Keen does so, however, in a repetitively derogatory tone towards "the establishment". This kinda makes him seem like the self perceived genius who never got the credit he deserved, and who is now angry at the world. Misunderstood genius or not, in retrospect it certainly seems that he is on the winning side regarding the key argument about rogue banks creating demand through credits, and he may be one of the few who managed to silence the great Paul Krugman.
Some of his other key points seem a bit tiresome. He spends a lot of words "debunking" supply and demand mechanics, arguing that the two interact and thus cannot be depicted independently. Again he is right of course, but the result of this mutual dependency will shape "synthesized" supply and demand curves where each will change given an exogenous change to the other. I doubt that many "mainstream economists" believe them to be just that, but simple models have the advantage of being I get the feeling that he creates "false adversaries" and tries to make "mainstream economists" look foolish in order to prove them wrong and thus establish his own position.
Keen's accusation that "mainstream economists" use only static models "in the real world" seems to be rejected by peers, although few seem to dispute that current models need improvements. An interesting read nonetheless, and with more emphasis on what's important, and less "wanting to be right" I would have given the book 3 or 4 stars. Steve Keen debunks every economic myth you can think of and there are many. He also proposes a newish economic way forward to make capitalism work for society rather than against it.
Keen is not a communist or a revolutionary - he is simply explaining why neoliberal economics does not work and does not serve society in general at all well. This book explains the economic principles well but it uses a lot of mathematics which was for me was easier to understand in Steve's graphical representations of the maths.
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